Security-Oriented Policies and New Paradigms in the Persian Gulf

Security-Oriented Policies and New Paradigms in the Persian Gulf

Sea-based Development (Blue Economy) as the Axis of Iran’s Macro Development Policies

Dr. Mohammad Farazmand

Abstract: The accumulation of security problems in the Persian Gulf region does not necessarily mean that solutions for stability and development must also be security-oriented. Now, after nearly five decades since the collapse of the security order known as Nixon’s Twin Pillars Doctrine, and in light of events particularly in the last decade, one can question the effectiveness and priority of traditional security-centric approaches for filling the region’s geopolitical gaps. The implementation of hundreds of billions of dollars in economic mega-projects in the southern Persian Gulf – especially in the energy and transportation infrastructure sectors, which are the two main comparative advantages of this region – along with Iran’s unparalleled capacities to develop its own infrastructure in these fields, and with the attention of elites and policymakers on both sides of the waterway to the benefits of integrated development and connecting infrastructure projects to one another to increase economic productivity, have led to the emergence of a new paradigm regarding sources of sustainable security. The interconnected development of the Persian Gulf region, given its immense wealth

and resources and its prominent role in energy transit (about 20 % of the world’s oil exports pass through this waterway), can become the keyword for sustainable regional security and the alleviation of security concerns arising from competition and geopolitical threats. In other words, geoeconomic convergence can compensate for geopolitical weaknesses and gaps.

The choice of a sea-based development strategy by Iran – as the core of its developmental policies and investment strategy for developing the Makran and the Persian Gulf coasts – will increase the capacity for economic integration between the north and south of the Persian Gulf and the  Sea of Oman. This policy, alongside its important economic goals, also conveys a strong message to neighboring countries about the shared need for stability and tranquility in the Persian Gulf. Iran’s economic and geographical advantages – such as its ability to attract hundreds of billions of dollars in investment in energy and transportation infrastructures, and its location spanning five geo-political and geoeconomic regions (the Persian Gulf, Central Asia, the Caucasus, the Indian subcontinent, and Eurasia) – underscore Iran’s role in economic cooperation and the sustainable, integrated development of the West Asian region. Through the International North–South Transport Corridor (INSTC), Iran provides connectivity across vast geographical areas from Northern Europe to the Persian Gulf and South Asia. In a sustainable and interconnected development approach, countries’ economic infrastructure developments are not in confrontation or competition with one another but can complement each other and add value for neighboring states. The development of the Makran and Persian Gulf coasts and the North–South Corridor can complement projects such as the development of Iraq’s Al-Faw port and  Development Road, as well as the southern ports along the waterway.

Inefficacy of Security-Oriented Strategies

Security-centered plans and approaches on both sides of the Persian Gulf waterway rarely find common ground, because the underlying principles and sources of security provision differ between the north (Iran) and the south (Arab states). Since their independence, the countries of the southern Persian Gulf have sought security through defense pacts with Transregional powers. Disputes, rivalries, and unresolved border issues – even within the Arab states – have prevented their security from being addressed under a single scheme or treaty; consequently, each state has separately entered into military and security agreements with major powers.

On the other hand, the Islamic Republic of Iran perceives the prominent presence of Western powers in the Persian Gulf as a threat. Confrontations, military drills, and both verbal and actual threats by the great powers in this waterway reinforce this perception among Iranians. Over the past half-century the region has witnessed three major wars and numerous incidents, and the countries around this waterway have had differing perceptions of the sources of these threats and of how to resolve them. This divergence of perspectives has encompassed a broad range of issues — from Iran’s nuclear program to the Palestinian cause and resistance against Israel — extending across a wide geographical arc from Lebanon and Syria in the Levant to Yemen in the southern Arabian Peninsula.

Opposing the 1990 Iraqi occupation of Kuwait under Saddam Hussein was the sole major event that, to some extent, aligned Iran’s perspective with that of the southern Arab neighboring states. Both Iran and the Arab states of the Persian Gulf condemned the aggression, though Iran refrained from formally supporting U.S. military intervention while also not acting against it. This episode led to a brief improvement in Iran’s relations with its Arab neighbors. However, the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, the emergence of a new political order in Baghdad, and Baghdad’s growing ties with Tehran once again strained these relationships. Subsequently, the Arab Spring uprisings — particularly their spread to Yemen, Bahrain, and Syria — further intensified the securitization of Iran’s interactions with its Arab neighbors.

Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates  opposed the 2015 nuclear agreement between Iran and the major powers, voicing objections to their exclusion from the negotiation process. These tensions were exacerbated during the first Trump administration (2017–2021), a period marked by regional instability, including the blockade of Qatar by two GCC members,also the U.S. unilateral withdrawal from the JCPOA, and Washington’s pressure on Arab states to normalize relations with Israel through the Abraham Accords, to which Bahrain and the UAE ultimately subscribed. Collectively, these developments severely undermined prospects for establishing stable security between Iran and the Gulf Cooperation Council. (GCC).

The accumulation of security challenges initially compelled both sides to prioritize addressing their immediate security concerns. Even the de-escalation talks between Iran and Saudi Arabia in the 1990s and again during 2020–2022 in Baghdad were framed around security agendas and conducted by security officials. It was only when the Baghdad negotiations transitioned from a purely security-focused track to a political dialogue in 2023 that meaningful progress was achieved. The experience of dispute resolution between Iran and Saudi Arabia in these two distinct periods — following the Second War in 1991 and again in 2023 — serves as a compelling illustration of the notion that, in a region saturated with security dilemmas, more durable outcomes may be attainable through non-security approaches. During the 1990s, Iran–Saudi talks remained narrowly confined to security issues. Although these discussions — led by Saudi Arabia’s top security official, Prince Nayef bin Abdulaziz, and Iran’s then-Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, Dr. Hassan Rouhani — culminated in the signing of an unprecedented security agreement on April 7, 2001, they ultimately failed to establish stable bilateral relations or to resolve lingering security concerns. Within two years, the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, the emergence of a new political order in Baghdad, and growing divergences between Tehran and Riyadh caused the agreement to lapse into obscurity, further marginalized by subsequent developments such as the Arab Spring and the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).

Iranian Initiatives and Cold Responses from Arab Neighbors

Over the past four decades – especially after the ceasefire in the Iran–Iraq War in 1987, as stipulated in Paragraph 8 of UN Security Council Resolution 598 – Iran has proposed regional security frameworks involving the GCC countries and Iraq. However, almost all of these proposals have gone unanswered by the Arab neighbors. These initiatives have been revived under various names in each Iranian administration following the end of the Iran–Iraq War. Even during Iran's ninth government (2005–2013), the then-President attended the GCC summit in Doha in December 2007 and delivered a speech. He presented twelve proposals aimed at enhancing regional cooperation to the GCC leaders, which included ideas such as visa-free travel between Iran and the GCC states, the establishment of an economic cooperation organization, and collaboration in security and environmental sectors. However, this initiative was not even recorded in the official GCC documents and remained a gesture of goodwill by the host country, Qatar.

In 2023, however, circumstances shifted. For the first time, Iran's foreign minister convened a meeting with his Arab counterparts in the GCC. Due to prior preparations, consultations, and improved relations with all council members, this event was officially recorded in the GCC event calendar, marking it as a significant sign that both sides were moving past their traditional reservations toward one another.

Some of Iran’s initiatives officially presented or floated to the GCC states or in international forums include:

• The “Regional Dialogue Forum” initiative offered to the late Sultan Qaboos of Oman during the Iranian president’s visit to Muscat in March 2014.
• The conceptual framework for regional dialogues and the Mecca Declaration presented to the Omani Foreign Minister in April 2014 (the Omani side later announced that Saudi Arabia had not accepted this initiative).
• A proposal to hold a 6+1 summit immediately after the finalization of the JCPOA, with Qatari mediation (this proposal was also rejected by Saudi Arabia).
• A written response by Iran’s president to a proposal from the Emir of Kuwait in 2016. This letter was presented at the GCC summit in Manama, but due to the onset of the U.S. “maximum pressure” campaign on Iran, the GCC members preferred to wait and see the outcome of those pressures.
• The Hormuz Peace Endeavor or “Hope Initiative,” presented by Iran’s president at the UN General Assembly in autumn 2019. Subsequently, this initiative was sent in writing by Iran’s president to the GCC heads of state and to Iraq. Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain did not respond to this letter. It is worth noting that during this period the Persian Gulf region was engulfed in turmoil caused by Trump’s policies in his first term – including the blockade of Qatar by some GCC members – which complicated regional dynamics.

Three years after Iran’s last unaddressed initiative, the Beijing Agreement between Iran and Saudi Arabia was successfully reached in March 2023 through bilateral negotiations mediated by China. Prior to this, China had played a minimal role in previous efforts to resolve regional disputes. While Iraq, Oman, Qatar, the UN Secretary-General and his envoys, along with several European countries, had participated in traditional Track II dialogues, these efforts had largely faltered due to the dominant security paradigms and ongoing crises in the region.

Beijing Agreement

The Beijing Agreement between Iran and Saudi Arabia, mediated by China in March 2023, marked a pivotal moment in their relations after seven years of severed diplomatic ties. This agreement, negotiated in Beijing by Iran’s Supreme National Security Council Secretary (Ali Shamkhani) and Saudi Arabia’s National Security Adviser (Musaid bin Mohammed Al-Aiban), effectively ended the security and political disputes that had long divided the two nations. Following this, the foreign ministers of both countries met in Beijing, and soon after, the embassies in Tehran and Riyadh resumed full operations.

The resumption of diplomatic relations between Tehran and Riyadh quickly became a model for bilateral ties between these two key regional powers. The swift restoration of full diplomatic relations and the mutual exchange of ambassadors soon after the Beijing agreement underscored the commitment of both countries to move beyond past differences and embark on a new chapter. This shift was not exclusive to Saudi Arabia; even before this, the United Arab Emirates had worked to improve its relations with Tehran, sending its ambassador to Iran.

The nature and quality of the relationship between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia have always been critical in shaping the political and security dynamics of West Asia. In the weeks following the renewal of diplomatic ties, their influence was already visible on other regional issues, including Syria, Yemen, and Bahrain, and this impact continues. Both countries have also aligned their positions on the Gaza conflict and Israel’s aggression against Lebanon, leading to the convening of meetings by the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) at the level of foreign ministers and heads of state. The growing sense of cooperation and mutual understanding between Iran and Saudi Arabia has played a key role in enhancing the OIC's prominence, strengthening Islamic solidarity, and amplifying the organization’s global influence.

Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has condemned Israel’s violations of the sovereignty of both Iran and Lebanon on several occasions, including at the 2024 summits of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation and the Arab League in Riyadh. He has also called for non-aggression against Iran’s territory. These statements were reiterated after the first round of indirect Iran–U.S. talks in Muscat. In addition, Saudi Arabia’s Minister of Defense, Prince Khalid bin Salman, traveled to Tehran in April 2025 to deliver a written message from the King to Iran’s Supreme Leader, signaling a shift in the political dynamics of the Arab neighbours. Iran, which has proposed multiple initiatives for regional cooperation, welcomed this new paradigm without hesitation.

An unprecedented event preceded this: in November 2024, General Fayyad bin Hamad Al-Ruwaili, the Chief of Staff of the Saudi Armed Forces, visited Tehran and held consultations with his Iranian counterpart, Major General Mohammad Bagheri, at Iran’s Armed Forces Headquarters. The announcement that the two countries had agreed to conduct joint maritime exercises took many observers by surprise, especially those who had doubted the seriousness of both countries in moving beyond their historical rivalries. With cooperation between Iran and Saudi Arabia, the security of navigation in the Persian Gulf, Sea of Oman, and Red Sea will reach a new level. This is a task that great powers have failed to achieve over centuries, often citing their presence in the region and imposing significant costs on local states. However, it is now possible for the Islamic Republic of Iran and Saudi Arabia to accomplish this together, with lower costs and greater confidence. The visits of Saudi Arabia’s defense minister and the chief of staff of its armed forces to Tehran indicate that Saudi leadership has now chosen to manage the Iran file at the highest levels through top officials of the kingdom.

The start of this new trajectory between Iran and Saudi Arabia — and other southern neighbors — based on a revised understanding of security and regional relations, has rapidly transformed the overall climate between Iran and the Arab countries. Even major events such as the October 7, 2023, operation, the return of Donald Trump to U.S. politics, and the initiation of talks between Iran and the U.S. over the Iranian nuclear issue — each of which could have been a game-changer — have not derailed or undermined this new approach.

In contrast to Saudi Arabia and the UAE’s stance on the 2015 nuclear agreement, in 2025 the Saudi government and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) expressed support for an agreement regarding Iran’s nuclear program. Similarly, unlike during Trump’s first term, the GCC members are not pursuing confrontation between the U.S. and Iran. Instead, four GCC members -  Oman, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar — have taken the lead in facilitating the resolution of differences between Iran and the U.S. Even before the commencement of the talks in Muscat, these countries had announced their readiness to play an active role and host the negotiations.

Essential Steps to Consolidate Mutual Interests (2-2)

As two key stabilizing forces in the region, Iran and Saudi Arabia must take several crucial steps to solidify the progress made in their renewed relations:

• Avoid superficial relations: The relationship between Iran and Saudi Arabia must extend beyond fragile, purely political engagements. Both countries should establish cooperative frameworks in key areas such as energy, trade, transportation, culture and media, education, and tourism.

• Pursue energy investment collaboration: Given Iran’s substantial potential for energy sector investments and its need for foreign capital, Saudi Arabia’s participation in Iranian oil, gas, and renewable energy projects could not only yield mutual economic benefits but also enhance the security of energy production and exports, contributing to the region’s long-term sustainability.

• Broaden cultural and people-to-people exchanges: Cultural ties between the two nations should extend beyond the Hajj and Umra pilgrimage. The resumption of direct flights between major cities in Iran and Saudi Arabia, alongside facilitating the entry of citizens and businesspeople from both countries, would promote more robust interpersonal interactions and exchanges.

• Minimize sectarian and ethnic divisions: Recently, both Iran and Saudi Arabia have been less inclined to exacerbate sectarian or ethnic tensions, recognizing that such divisions are counterproductive. They should continue to avoid inflaming these differences, as doing so would waste regional resources and hinder stability.

 Iran’s domestic efforts to foster national unity – such as incorporating Sunni elites and specialists into the cabinet and provincial leadership positions – have not only addressed internal needs but also had a positive external impact by improving relations within the Muslim world and easing sectarian divides. The cessation of sectarian and ethnic conflict in the region will rely on greater political, cultural, and religious solidarity between Iran and Saudi Arabia.

• Enhance high-level bilateral engagement: Thus far, Iran and Saudi leaders have only interacted on the sidelines of multilateral international events. It is time for both countries to arrange dedicated bilateral summits between their top leadership. When this occurs, it will undoubtedly be one of the most important political milestones in the region, with immediate benefits for their bilateral relations and for regional stability.

Iran and the Gulf Cooperation Council: New Horizons of Cooperation (2-3)

In November 2024 (Aban 1403), Abbas Araghchi, embarked on the first foreign trips as the foreign minister of the new government (the 14th government). After visiting Lebanon and Syria amid Israeli airstrikes, he traveled to Riyadh and Doha. During the autumn of 2024, when he accompanied the President on trips to New York for the UN General Assembly and to Doha for the Asian Cooperation Dialogue summit, Araghchi also took the opportunity to meet with GCC members on the sidelines, particularly with his Saudi counterpart and the Secretary General of the GCC.

These meetings culminated in a joint session with the GCC member states in Doha — the first such gathering since the Council’s formation in 1980. Although the meeting was described as unofficial, with no photographs released, such informal sessions can sometimes carry more significance than formal ones in regional diplomatic practice. The combination of these developments and the intensifying Iran-GCC engagement signals the beginning of a new phase in their relations.

In the past, Iran and the GCC have experienced brief periods of improved relations — for example, following the Kuwaiti crisis in the early 1990s — but these have typically been short-lived, overshadowed by subsequent events. Significant occurrences such as the 2003 change of government in Iraq, incidents during the Hajj seasons, and the upheaval of the 2011 Arab Spring (particularly in Syria, Bahrain, and Yemen) led Iran and its Arab neighbors to find themselves on opposing sides of these crises. The 2015 nuclear agreement (JCPOA) between Iran and the P5+1, along with Arab concerns about being excluded from the process, further exacerbated tensions, freezing relations between the GCC and Iran.

In the current phase of normalization and de-escalation efforts – which began about two years ago with Riyadh’s shift in policy and China’s emerging role as a mediator and guarantor – several promising developments have arisen, potentially extending this period of détente and fostering more durable agreements. For instance, after President Masoud Pezeshkiyan’s visit to Doha on October 3–4, 2024, and his subsequent meeting with the Saudi foreign minister, it became possible for an Iranian foreign minister to participate in a joint session with the GCC foreign ministers for the first time in the Council’s 45-year history. Over the past three decades, since the conclusion of the Iran-Iraq War, Iran has consistently sought cooperation with the GCC within the framework of a regional security plan, as discussed earlier in relation to Iranian initiatives.

Two key features define the GCC countries: firstly, their shared coastlines along a common maritime waterway, on which Iran possesses the longest coastline; and secondly, the similarity in their political systems, which has kept the Council a closed and exclusive body, limiting membership to no other countries. However, this characteristic has not prevented the GCC members from cooperating with external actors. Iran shares one of these two defining traits, as it too has a long coastline along the Persian Gulf.

Concerns about forming collective relations were not limited to the GCC countries. On the Iranian side, skeptics argued that Iran should refrain from cooperation as long as the Council’s statements included clauses addressing Iran’s territorial integrity. Conversely, realists and advocates of diplomacy contended that meaningful change could not occur without communication. Furthermore, Iran already maintains its most extensive trade and engagement with the very country central to this issue—the United Arab Emirates—making it illogical for multilateral relations to be held hostage by this bilateral issue which is not the only of its type in the region.

The Doha meeting signified a shift in the mindsets of both the GCC members and Iran, signaling their intent to overcome the barriers and stalemates that have hindered collective cooperation. This development should be viewed as a positive sign. Clearly, rebuilding and strengthening bilateral relations with each GCC member sets the stage for broader multilateral cooperation. For example, Turkey, after resolving even deeper disagreements with Saudi Arabia and the UAE, resumed its collaboration with the GCC, and its foreign minister was invited back to a joint meeting with the Council in 2023 (1402) after more than a decade.

Active and effective bilateral diplomacy serves as the cornerstone of multilateral diplomacy. The initiatives launched in the past year with Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain have undoubtedly been instrumental in addressing the GCC’s reservations and facilitating the Doha meeting. The remaining three GCC members – Oman, Qatar, and Kuwait – have consistently shown a willingness to cooperate with Iran on a collective level and have intermittently played roles as mediators and facilitators of dialogue.

One of the key challenges to collective cooperation between Iran and the GCC members has been their opposing positions on regional crises, particularly the 2003 regime change in Iraq and the Arab Spring events that followed in 2011. These developments deepened the divisions, with Iran and the GCC drifting further apart, especially as crises in Iraq, Syria, Bahrain, and Yemen forced both sides into increasingly polarized alignments. Some Arab officials even argued that Iran should be excluded from discussions on Arab world issues. This stance, however, overlooked key realities: Iran is an integral part of the region and has long borders with 7 Arab counties ; an Arab neighbor imposed an eight-year war on Iran; Iran has paid a significant price in its relations with the West by defending core Arab issues, such as Palestine; and, moreover, the Arab world has not adopted a unified approach toward Iran. In fact, some GCC members have not always supported a complete disengagement from Iran. Simultaneously, some of Iran’s closest allies have been Arab nations. Furthermore, it begs the question: which other country – particularly one that is a regional neighbor – has been subjected to such double standards in terms of diplomatic engagement?

The Role of Iran’s Strategic Sea-Based Development Policy in Enhancing the Persian Gulf’s Geoeconomic Status

 Iran, strategically positioned at the crossroads of five major geographic and civilizational regions – the Persian Gulf, the Indian subcontinent, Central Asia, the Caucasus, and Eurasia – lies between two seas and benefits from thousands of kilometers of coastline and numerous islands, all rich in untapped potential. As such, Iran possesses considerable opportunities for establishing a powerful economic infrastructure both on and beyond its coasts, in the sea and the ocean, utilizing these resources as a driver of national development and a path to achieving a prominent regional and global status.

The Persian Gulf, covering just under 240,000 square kilometers, is the world’s third-largest gulf. The Sea of Oman, spanning around 900,000 square kilometers, represents the extension of the Indian Ocean into the lands of Southwest Asia. Meanwhile, the Caspian Sea, covering approximately 400,000 square kilometers, is the world’s largest inland body of water. Iran, including its islands in the Persian Gulf, boasts roughly 5,800 kilometers of coastline, with 4,900 kilometers along the southern shores (Persian Gulf and Gulf of Oman) and the remainder along the northern coast (Caspian Sea), granting it a unique strategic position in the region. According to official studies, Iran’s total coastline across the north and south exceeds 5,790 kilometers. The waters under Iran’s sovereignty account for about one-quarter of the country’s total area, while more than 200 million square kilometers of high seas and open ocean are available for exploitation. Thus, under conventional maritime definitions, the Islamic Republic of Iran can be regarded as a maritime nation. In November 2023 (Aban 1402), Iran’s Supreme Leader issued the overarching sea-based development policies for the government to implement.

One key infrastructure linking Iran’s sea-based development capacity to its neighbors is the International North–South Transport Corridor (INSTC). This corridor is one of the world’s most important transit projects, designed to connect India and South Asia to Russia, the Caucasus, and Europe. This 8,500-kilometer corridor, combining sea, rail, and road transport, provides the shortest route between Northern and Southern Asia. The proposed route starts from India and, via Iran’s southern ports (including Chabahar and Bandar Abbas), connects to the Caspian Sea and then to Russia and Europe. Using this route can reduce transit time for goods from 40–45 days (via the Suez Canal) to about 20 days, and can cut costs by up to 30 %. The North–South Corridor has the potential to carry 30 to 50 million tons of cargo annually. Of course, expanding the capacity of Iran’s ports and rail and road networks is necessary to fully exploit this corridor’s potential.

Conclusion

-After nearly five decades of efforts to compete and fill gaps from a geopolitical perspective, Iran and its southern neighbors in the Persian Gulf are gradually developing a new understanding of sustainable security based on interconnected development. In other words, the Persian Gulf region is moving from a geopolitical paradigm toward a geoeconomic paradigm.

-Although the Islamic Republic of Iran had put forward numerous initiatives over four decades to develop cooperation with the GCC and initially did not receive a warm response, Iran has warmly welcomed the shift in approach by the GCC members – especially the United Arab Emirates and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia – in the past three years.

-In this new chapter of relations between Iran and the Cooperation Council, we are witnessing that countries which once feared the JCPOA are now supporting the negotiations between Iran and the United States for a new nuclear agreement. Likewise, they are not supporting any military option against Iran by the U.S. or Israel. This change in stance should not be seen merely as a precautionary measure; rather, it reflects a deeper paradigm shift in the Arab neighbouring countries, one that was set far before the events of October 7, 2023 and by the evolving U.S. political landscape.

-If successfully reached, a new nuclear agreement with Iran would have significant regional support. The negotiations are being mediated by a trusted Arab country (Oman), with the other three GCC members—Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar—expressing their willingness to help ensure the success of the talks. It is anticipated that the role of these regional nations will extend beyond simply facilitating the negotiations, with their participation expected in the economic aspects of the deal. Iran has also expressed openness to sharing its advancements in peaceful nuclear technology and knowledge with its neighbors.

-Iran’s strategic sea-based development policy (Blue Economy) complements the vast infrastructure projects underway in the southern Persian Gulf. By connecting these initiatives, Iran can add value to the entire region. The North-South INSTC corridor’s potential to link Northern Europe to the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean, alongside Iran’s need for significant investment in transportation and energy infrastructure, presents substantial opportunities for cooperation on both sides of the Gulf.

-Ultimately, the accumulation of security challenges in the Persian Gulf does not imply that regional stability and development must be pursued solely through security measures. In the recent phase of rapprochement between Iran and Saudi Arabia, which culminated in the Beijing Agreement in February 2023, both sides prioritized a political resolution, swiftly moving beyond security concerns—unlike the negotiations in 1990, where security issues were the dominant focus. This indicates that the region’s future may not lie in intensifying security rivalries, but rather in integrated development and cooperation.